Thursday, June 29, 2006

citizensagainstcorruptjudges: Harper is required by Civil Code section 1954.535 to give the tenant 90

citizensagainstcorruptjudges: Harper is required by Civil Code section 1954.535 to give the tenant 90
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dannoynted1 said...

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS


UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Plaintiff


CIVIL ACTION NO.
v.

CAMP RIVERVIEW, INC.
d/b/a CAMP RIVERVIEW,
JIMMY MEYER, individually,
and SUZANNE MEYER,
individually

Defendants

______________________________


PLAINTIFF UNITED STATES' COMPLAINT FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
The United States of America alleges that:

1. This action is brought by the Attorney General on behalf of the United States to enforce Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Public Accommodations Act), 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq.


Jurisdiction
2. This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a(a), 2000a-2, and 2000a-5(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1345.

3. Venue is proper in the Western District of Texas because the acts at issue occurred in this District, and the Defendants do business here.


The Parties
4. Defendant Camp Riverview, Inc. is a Texas corporation. Camp Riverview, Inc., operates in Concan, Texas, in the Western District of Texas.

5. Defendant Jimmy Meyer is the President, a Director and co-owner of Camp Riverview, Inc.

6. Defendant Suzanne Meyer is a Director and co-owner of Camp Riverview, Inc.

7. Camp Riverview is a campground with approximately 30 spaces for overnight camping as well as several cabins and shelters. The campground is located at HCR 70, Box 471, in Concan, Texas.

8. Camp Riverview is a place of public accommodation within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b)(1).

9. The operation of Camp Riverview affects commerce within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(c)(1).

10. Upon information and belief, both Jimmy Meyer and Suzanne Meyer currently reside in Concan, Texas, on the Camp Riverview property.


Title II Violations
11. Defendants, through their own actions, or the actions of their employees or agents, have implemented a policy and practice of denying to Hispanic individuals, on account of national origin and/or color, the full and equal enjoyment of Defendants' goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations, on the same basis as they make them available to white persons. Defendants and their agents have carried out this policy and practice by, among other things:


Evicting Hispanic individuals from the campground property;

Harassing Hispanic guests who are staying at Camp Riverview;

Enforcing campground rules in a discriminatory manner on the basis of national origin (i.e., Hispanic);

Denying Hispanic individuals accommodations; and

Intimidating, threatening, coercing, or attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce persons with the purpose of interfering with their rights to equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations offered to patrons of the campground.
12. Defendants' conduct constitutes a pattern or practice of resistance to the full and equal enjoyment by Hispanic individuals of rights secured by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq., and the pattern or practice is of such a nature and is intended to deny the full exercise of such rights. Unless restrained by Order of this Court, Defendants will continue to refuse to provide Hispanic individuals with the full and equal enjoyment of rights secured to them by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq.

Prayer for Relief
WHEREFORE, the United States requests that the Court enter an Order:

1. Declaring that the discriminatory practices and policies of the Defendants violate Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq.;

2. Enjoining Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, from engaging in any act or practice which, on the basis of national origin and/or color, denies or abridges any rights secured by Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, et seq.;

3. Enjoining Defendants, their employees, agents, successors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with them, from: (a) intimidating, threatening, coercing, and attempting to intimidate, threaten, or coerce persons with the purpose of interfering with their rights or privileges secured by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2; and/or (2) punishing or attempting to punish persons for exercising or attempting to exercise any right or privilege secured by 42 U.S.C. § 2000a, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2; and

4. Requiring Defendants, their employees, agents, and successors, and all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them, to take such affirmative steps as may be necessary to remedy the past unlawful conduct.

The United States further prays for such additional relief as the interests of justice may require, together with the costs and disbursement of this action.


JOHN ASHCROFT
Attorney General

10:50 PM
dannoynted1 said...

NO. 06- EV-000148- JP2-2

Cause no. 06-6150000-5


PATRICIA AND KEVIN HARPER

VS.

ANTON SCOTT HALEY



MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT AND/OR MOTION TO SUSPEND ENFORCEMENT AND IN THE ALTERNATIVE MOTION TO SET AMOUNT OF SUPERCEDES BOND AND/OR MOTION TO
DEPOSIT CASH IN LIEU OF BOND



On the 27th day of June, 2006, came Anton Scott Haley to be heard on his MOTION TO DELAY PROCEEDINGS TO ALLOW TIME FOR PLAINTIFFS TO RESPOND TO DEFENDANTS MOTION FOR WRITTEN DISCOVERY. Instead the court proceeded as if there were no pending motions, namely DEFENDANTS CERTIFICATE OF WRITTEN DISCOVERY DIRECTED TO PLAINTIFFS PATRICIA AND KEVIN HARPER AND REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION AND REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE AND DEFENDANTS FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES Filed on the 21st of June, 2006 at the Nueces County District Clerk.

Defendant objected to all subsequent actions that occurred during this proceeding.
The Court in the above numbered and styled cause issued a writ of possession to Patricia Harper. Defendant timely filed NOTICE OF APPEAL AND A PAUPERS AFFADAVIT AND A REQUEST FOR COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL AND A COPY OF TRANSCRIPT OF THE COURT PROCEEDINGS and motion with the Nueces County District Clerk on The 30th day of June, 2006.
Defendant’s mail was delivered for the first time on the 30th day of June since June 7th and Nueces County Court at law 5 trial courts written notice of trial was not in the bundle of mail.
Letter from this court was stolen. Defendant asks that the court take judicial notice of the courts OWN file.
A police report was taken by Corpus Christi Police Department on 1st day of July 2006.
Patricia or Kevin Harper informed Lamar park postal carrier who delivers mail to HUD section 8 residence 5102 Bevly, where the defendant resides, was told to hold for owner on the 7th day of June 2006, the same day of the original hearing in Nueces county JP court precinct 2 place 2 was held. Police report #06038702 and defendant intends to press FEDERAL charges of mail fraud AND tampering with their mail.


In this the above number and styled cause DEFENDANT REQUESTS A COPY OF THIS COURT’S WRITTEN NOTICE OF TRIAL DATE TO THE DEFENDANT

Plaintiffs have been paid rent for the month of June and will be paid by section 8 for the month of July and respectfully requests this Court to allow Movant access to our judicial system.
Under the Texas Property Code, the judgment of a county court may be stayed pending appeal if signed; Within 10 days of the signing of the judgment and appellant files a supersedeas bond in the amount set by the county court. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. @ 24.007(Vernon 2000); Kemper v. Stonegate Manor Apartments, Ltd., 29 S.W.3d 362, 363 (Tex. App.- Beaumont 2000, pet. dism’d w.o.j.). An appellant Court is empowered to stay the judgment of a County Court in a forcible detainer action only if a supersedeas bond has been filed. Id. Otherwise, the judgment of the county court may not be stayed and not allow due process to be adequately protected as there are no discernable damages accruing as the plaintiffs are further protected as T.R.A.P. 24.3 allows the trial court to modify the amount or type of security required if circumstances change.
The Equal Protection Clause and Due Process Clauses of the United States Constitution prohibit conditioning appellate review upon satisfaction of a financial requirement regardless of ability to pay.

When judicial review is provided, a citizen’s right to appellate review is fundamental to our judicial system and cannot be conditioned on the party’s ability to pay. Allowing appellate review for only those tenants who can afford to post a supersedeas bond violates the equal protection clauses of the U. S. Constitution. See Lindsey v. Normet,
405 U. S. 56, 74 – 80, 92 S. Ct. 862, 874 - 77, 31 L. Ed. 2d 36 (1972) .In The Lindsey case, the Supreme Court held that a double – bond prerequisite for appealing an eviction judgment violates equal protection. Id. at 74 – 80 , 92 S. Ct. at 874 – 77. The Court explained:
The discrimination against the poor, who could pay their rent pending appeal but cannot post the double bond, is particularly obvious. For them, as a practical matter, appeal is foreclosed, no matter how meritorious their case may be. The non-indigent FED appellant also is confronted by a substantial barrier to appeal faced by no other civil litigant in Oregon. The discrimination against the class of FED appellants is arbitrary and irrational, and the double – bond requirement…. Violates the Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 79, 92 S. Ct. at 877 (statutory citation omitted)

Since Texas has created an appeal as right from the trial courts judgment, that right cannot be infringed in a manner inconsistent with due process or equal protection. “[A] cost requirement , valid on it’s face , may offend due process because it operates to foreclose a particular party’s opportunity to be heard.” Boddie v Connecticut, 401 U. S.
371, 380, 91 S. Ct. 780, 787, 28 L. Ed. 2d 113 (1971). Requiring a party to post a supersedeas bond to maintain possession of the premises during the appeal is constitutional. However, conditioning appellate review upon the financial ability of a party to post a supersedeas bond regardless of ability to pay, runs afoul of federal due process and equal protection principles and is unconstitutional.

PRAYER


Movant prays that the Court issue a temporary order suspending the issuance of a writ of possession which may issue on or after July 3,2006 according to the judgment.

Movant prays that the Court order the bond and/or reduced or the judgment suspended pending appeal.
Movant prays for general relief whether in equity or law.










Movant prays that the Court issue a temporary order suspending the issuance of a writ of possession which may issue on or after July 3,2006 according to the judgment.

Movant prays that the Court order the bond and/or reduced or the judgment suspended pending appeal.
Movant prays for general relief whether in equity or law.

9:44 PM

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